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Abstract 
This paper identifies and then quantifies econometrically the impact of leniency programs 
on the perception of the effectiveness of antitrust policies using country level panel data 
for a 10-year span. Leniency programs have been introduced gradually in antitrust 
legislation across the globe to fight more effectively against cartels. We use the dynamics of 
the diffusion of such policy innovation across countries and over time to evaluate the 
impact of the program. We find that leniency programs have had a significant impact on 
the perception among the business community of the effectiveness of each country‟s 
antitrust policy. Leniency programs have become weapons of mass dissuasion in the hands 
of antitrust enforcers against the more damaging forms of explicit collusion among rival 
firms in the market place. 
Keywords: Antitrust; Policy effectiveness; Political economy 
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1. Introduction 
Leniency or amnesty programs have been gradually introduced over the last 18 years in the 
fight against cartels. These antitrust enforcement programs can secure lenient treatment for 
early confessors and conspirators who supply information that is helpful to the antitrust 
authorities. Under the terms governing a leniency program, a firm or individual that first 
confesses to involvement in a cartel (supplying details of meeting dates and the timing of 
the price agreements) may avoid criminal conviction, fines, or a custodial sentence. In some 
programs these exemptions might also be extended to other cartel members who provide 
additional information regarding collusion. 
The first antitrust leniency program was created in the United States in 1973. However, it 
was largely ineffective until reformed in 1993. Its apparent success in obtaining evidence to 
prosecute cartel members, in destabilizing existing cartels, and in deterring cartel formation 
was quickly noted by antitrust authorities elsewhere and such programs were gradually 
adopted as part of antitrust enforcement reform across developed and developing 
economies. Italy was an early adopter of the program in 1990, followed by the European 
Commission in 1996 (a program that was overhauled in 2002), the UK in 1998, Belgium in 
1999 and Germany and Ireland in 2000. Spain was a relative latecomer, not adopting a 
leniency program until 2007, as were Estonia and Lithuania (2008) and Slovenia (2010). By 
2011, all the EU Member States had introduced leniency programs in their antitrust 
legislation.5  
A leniency program was to be found on all five continents by 2007. The 1997 program in 
Korea was the first to be adopted in Asia. Israel introduced its program in 1999, Brazil, 
Canada and New Zealand adopted theirs in 2000, India in 2003 and Singapore and South 
Africa in 2004. This global diffusion of leniency programs ran parallel to the increase in the 
number of developing countries adopting antitrust laws (OECD 2002, 2003). Thus, in 
2007, of the 151 developing countries 77 had enacted antitrust legislation and appointed 
antitrust authorities, while in 1990 this figure stood at just 10 (Waked, 2010). 
Yet, Zhou (2011) claims that despite the evident popularity enjoyed by leniency programs 
the literature is ambiguous as to the deterrent effect of such programs. While Miller (2009) 
has shown that the aura of efficacy of the US program is matched by evidence, the efficacy 
of the EC leniency program is less clear (Brenner, 2009 and De, 2010). These mixed 
findings raise questions regarding the true impact of such programs in line with those 
raised by Waked (2010) in a more general examination of the drivers of antitrust laws in 
developing countries. This last study claims that legal provisions in such countries are often 
replicas of models employed by their developed counterparts and any evidence of the post-
adoption efficacy of antitrust laws is scarce. But as these so-called copy-and-paste laws are 
not tailored to meet local needs, their enforcement is often quite ineffective. 
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Waked (2010) argues that many developing countries adopted competition law not out of 
any great domestic conviction but rather because it comprised an obligation of regional 
trade deals. Indeed, an antitrust regime has often been a prerequisite for engagement in 
bilateral trade agreements, for securing admission into regional trade blocs, and for even 
participating in structural programs that open up developing economies (Marcos, 2006). 
For example, many Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements between the EU and 
countries such as Egypt, Jordan, Turkey and Tunisia include provisions linking financial 
cooperation to the implementation of antitrust legislation (Waked, 2010). 
This paper seeks to exploit this diffusion of leniency programs across the globe. Thus, it 
identifies and quantifies econometrically the impact of antitrust leniency programs on 
perceptions of the general effectiveness of antitrust policies with an unbalanced panel of 
countries for a ten-year span. We use the dynamics of the diffusion of this policy 
innovation across countries and over time to evaluate the impact of the program. We draw 
on program evaluation techniques to measure their impact on a broad measure of the 
country-level perception of antitrust effectiveness. Forced or exogenous variation in 
program adoption due to regional or bilateral agreements helps us in identifying 
econometrically a program‟s impact. 
We find that leniency programs have had a significant positive impact on the perception of 
a country‟s antitrust policy among business people. Leniency programs have become 
weapons of mass dissuasion in the hands of antitrust enforcers against the more damaging 
forms of explicit collusion among rival firms in the market place. We also find that 
countries self-select and are more likely to adopt the program according to observables 
such as per capita income and regional policy commitments. However, at each level of 
observed likelihood of adoption, those that exhibit lower unobserved antitrust 
effectiveness are also more likely to adopt the program as they benefit most from it. 
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 offers a brief literature review; Section 3 
provides details about the data and the methods used in the program evaluation; Section 4 
presents the results; and finally, Section 5 concludes and discusses the paper‟s findings. 
2. Literature review 
The literature on antitrust effectiveness can be broken down into three specific fields of 
research the first includes papers on the measurement of antitrust effectiveness (see 
Nicholson, 2008 and Voigt, 2009); the second involves the analysis of its drivers (see 
Borrell and Jiménez, 2008 and Ma, 2010); and the third uses indicators of antitrust 
effectiveness to explain productivity and economic growth (see Borrell and Tolosa, 2008a 
and 2008b, Voigt, 2009 and Ma, 2011). 
Nicholson (2008) undertakes a summary of existing antitrust measures. These include 
surveys, such as those undertaken by the International Institute for Management 
Development (IMD) and the World Economic Forum (WEF); discrete variables, provided 
in empirical studies that capture certain characteristics of competition law (see, for 
example, Evenett, 2003, Kee and Hoekman, 2007 and Borrell and Jiménez, 2008); input 
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and output measures of competition policy, such as agency budget and staffing levels, and 
the ratio between the two, etc.;6 and finally, qualitative analyses. Nicholson also proposes 
an antitrust law index to indicate the presence and complexity of “laws on the book” and 
reports that strong laws do not necessarily represent effective antitrust policy. 
Voigt (2009) introduces four new indicators of competition laws and agencies that reflect 
the basis and contents of competition legislation, the degree to which these laws are based 
on economic reasoning, the formal degree of independence of the antitrust authorities and 
their factual independence. He then relates these indicators with other policies, such as 
trade policy, and uses them to account for total factor productivity (TFP). He concludes 
that the quality of competition law and policy has a positive effect on TFP. 
Studies of the drivers of antitrust effectiveness include Borrell and Jiménez (2008). Using 
broad indicators of competition policy (including WEF data and a cross-country database), 
the authors analyze its impact on antitrust effectiveness. They conclude that while 
effectiveness depends on per capita income and EU membership, there are other policies 
that present a more significant correlation, namely adopting an economic approach to 
judge abusive practices, disposing of a competition-oriented merger policy and introducing 
innovative policies such as leniency programs. Yet, they are unable to clarify whether it is 
having a leniency program that matters, or whether such programs are simply correlated 
with unobservable drivers of effectiveness at the country level. Likewise, Ma (2010) 
establishes a causal relationship between antitrust effectiveness and competition authority 
independence and confirms that it is de facto independence that is important for antitrust 
effectiveness. 
Ma (2011a) reaches a similar outcome to that reported in his aforementioned study when 
using a simplified version of the Solow growth model to relate competition law 
enforcement and productivity growth. He concludes that the outcome driven by 
enforcement varies with a country‟s stage of development. 
Ma (2011b) uses WEF data to estimate the channel through which legal origin can 
influence antitrust effectiveness. Using cross-country data, the author concludes that legal 
flexibility (i.e., the adaptability channel) has a greater influence on antitrust effectiveness 
than authority independence does (i.e., the political channel). Interestingly, he reports that 
countries in which a judicial decision is a source of law adapt more easily to changing 
economic circumstances and, therefore, have better enforcement of antitrust rules. Finally, 
Borrell and Tolosa (2008a and 2008b) identify and quantify the impact of an improvement 
in antitrust effectiveness on total factor productivity and labour productivity. 
There is, however, a gap in the literature as cross-country comparisons of antitrust policy 
design has yet to tackle the question of whether there is anything to be learned in terms of 
the effectiveness of antitrust or competition policy efficiency from the dynamics of 
adoption of leniency programs. Here, it is our aim to fill this gap. 
                                                     
6 Waked (2010) analyzes the factors that affect decisions regarding the budget and staffing levels of 
competition authorities in developing countries. 
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3. Data and Methods 
3.1.  Data 
The International Institute for Management Development (IMD) kindly provided us with 
information for one of the criteria reported at the country level in its World 
Competitiveness Yearbook. Specifically, IMD supplied us with criterion number 2.4.11: 
“Competition legislation” (Factor: Government Efficiency; Sub-factor: Competition and 
Regulations). Data are taken from its Executive Opinion Survey. 
The IMD‟s World Competitiveness Center conducts an Executive Opinion Survey to 
complement hard statistical data drawn from international, national and regional sources. 
The aim of the survey is to measure competitiveness as it is perceived. The surveys are sent 
out to senior business leaders, representing a cross-section of the business community in 
each country. The questions are targeted to top and middle management, who are nationals 
or expatriates employed in local or foreign firms with an international dimension. The 
sample size and its distribution are proportional to the GDP breakdown of the economic 
sectors in each country‟s economy. Executives are asked to evaluate the present and 
expected competitiveness conditions for the country in which they have lived and worked 
for the past year. IMD alumni are also contacted. In the survey conducted in 2011, the 
IMD obtained 4,935 responses from 59 countries worldwide. 
Many papers have used this information or similar data provided by the World Economic 
Forum as their perceived measure of antitrust effectiveness.7 Here, under criterion 2.4.11: 
“Competition legislation”, the survey asks executives to rank on a scale from 1 to 6 
whether “Competition legislation is efficient in preventing unfair competition.” The data 
are subsequently converted to a 0 to 10 scale. The IMD provided us with an unbalanced 
panel dataset containing information about the average country-level result for this item for 
the 46 countries included in its 1998 Yearbook and for the next 10 years. Each year the 
yearbook has increased the number of countries included so that in 2007 it provided 
information for 54. In our database, this variable ranges from 2.40 to 8.59. As Table 1 
shows, the mean value for this variable is just 5.62, and its standard deviation is 1.23. 
As the main purpose of our paper is to study the impact of leniency programs on antitrust 
efficiency, we gathered data concerning antitrust policy reforms in all the countries for 
which IMD antitrust effectiveness data were available. We were specifically concerned with 
identifying if and when leniency programs had been introduced. We obtained this 
information at the country level from various sources including the websites of individual 
                                                     
7 Borrell and Jiménez (2008), Nicholson (2008), Waked (2011) and Ma (2011, forthcoming) use WEF data on 
antitrust effectiveness. 
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antitrust authorities and the International Competition Network (ICN). Table 1 also shows 
the descriptive statistics of these data.8 
Our information includes antitrust effectiveness perceptions for three jurisdictions 
(Mainland China, Hong Kong and Malaysia), from a total of 53, that have yet to enact 
conventional antitrust legislation (at least before 2008), but whose governments forbid and 
prosecute certain restrictions on competition. The remaining countries all introduced 
competition legislation either before or after 1998. Here, we distinguish between those (a 
total of nine countries) that had enacted such legislation prior to this date, from the rest (41 
countries), as our goal is to assess the impact of leniency programs during the ten years 
commencing 1998. This said, it is difficult to identify any impact when such programs were 
created at the same time, or at a date very close to, the enactment of the first law. 
Our dataset is characterised by the wealth of cross-country information it provides on EU 
Member States (37% of observations), new EU Member States that have entered the 
Union during the last two enlargements (6% of sample), NAFTA countries (6% of sample), 
countries from the Asian-Pacific (6% of sample), and Mercosur countries (4% of 
observations), and the Andean Community (4% of observations). Overall, 58% of our 
observations are of country-year pairs in which regional agreements were binding. This is 
of relevance as some of these regional agreements contain binding commitments as regards 
competition law, and some even provide for the adoption of leniency programs (the case of 
the EU). Table 2 lists the countries making up the sample which during any one year were 
members of one of these regional agreements. 
Table 1 shows that a leniency program is enforced for as many as 37% of the country-year 
pairs. Table 3 shows the adoption dynamics of leniency programs in the countries included 
in the IMD‟s Executive Survey between 1998 and 2007. So, while just 2% (i.e., the US) of 
the sample operated such a program in 1998, by 2007 over two-thirds (69%) had adopted 
one. 
The “leniency” variable takes a value of 1 from the year a leniency program was 
implemented in any country. In addition to these two key variables, we collected a set of 
other covariates for which we wish to control in our econometric estimations. Thus, we 
record whether the country had been implementing a competition law prior to the onset of 
our study period. We also control for “first law” whenever the first antitrust legislation was 
enacted during the period 1998 to 2007. Additionally, the “law reform” variable records if a 
country reformed its competition legislation during the sample period. This being the case 
then the variable takes a value of 1 in any year following that policy reform. 
A further factor related to competition policy is the “age of competition law” variable, 
which indicates how many years the law has been in force. It has a mean of approximately 
25 years. We collected these data from a wide range of national legislative sources. 
                                                     
8 We use data for 53 countries as the GDP per capita for Taiwan is unavailable. This country is, as a result, 
excluded from our analysis. 
7 
Other characteristics at the country level are captured by two variables. The first, gross 
domestic product per capita (hereinafter, GDP), measures the income of the country in 
current US dollars ($). Table 1 shows that the mean GDP per capita in our sample is about 
15,788$. The “elections” variable takes a value of 1 in the year the country held general or 
presidential elections. Twenty-five per cent of country-year pairs in our sample held 
elections. This variable is deemed relevant as leniency programs typically result from 
broader competition legislation reforms, which in turn correlate with government changes 
following elections. 
 
3.2.  Method 
The dynamics of the adoption of antitrust leniency programs are ideally suited to the 
settings of a program evaluation exercise. Typically, the main problem in an empirical 
exercise of this type is assessing the impact of exposing a set of units to a treatment on a 
given outcome (Imbens and Wooldridge, 2009). Here, our units are the countries of the 
world, our treatment is the adoption of an antitrust leniency program, and the outcome is 
the perceived efficiency of competition legislation or antitrust effectiveness (see Section 4). 
The key methodological concern in program evaluation is that each unit (in this instance, 
country) is exposed or otherwise to the treatment, and that only one case or the other is 
observed, i.e., the outcome can only be measured in the case of treatment or in that of non-
treatment (the controls). Citing Holland (1986), Imbens and Wooldridge (2009) refer to 
this concern as “the fundamental problem of causal inference”. Thus, to assess the impact 
of leniency programs, we need to compare countries at different points in time, some of 
which have adopted leniency programs (treated group) and others that have not (control 
group). 
In the case of binary treatments, Imbens and Wooldridge (2009) remind us that the 
traditional focus in the econometrics literature is that of endogeneity or self-selection: 
countries that adopt leniency programs differ from those that choose not to do so. When 
these differences condition the response to the treatment, comparing the outcomes of the 
treated and the control groups does not offer causal inferences of the impact of the 
program under evaluation, even when we are able to control for observed covariates. For 
instance, OLS estimates of difference-in-difference (hereafter, dif-in-dif) estimators may be 
biased when there is selection based on unobservable as follows. 
Let   
Yit i t Dit Xit
´ wit it  
be the dif-in-dif equation to be estimated in order to identify the causal effect of the 
treatment (leniency program) on the outcome (antitrust effectiveness), . In this equation 
we assume that the error term has two components, an iid shock named it that cannot be 
anticipated at the beginning of period t , and an unobserved component of the outcome 
that can be anticipated at the beginning of period t . 
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Selection on unobservables is a problem when 
 
Dit 1 Zit it 0 , 
and 
E wit it 0 . 
 
For instance, at the beginning of the period, the policy makers know it , and decide to 
self-select into the treatment whenever antitrust effectiveness is low or whenever it is high. 
In this case, the bias of the OLS estimate is as follows: 
 
OLS
Cov YD
Var D
Cov D
Var D
IV Bias  
 
OLS
Cov YD
Var D
Cov
Var D
IV Bias  
 
OLS IV Bias  
 
Bias OLS IV
Cov
Var D
 
 
where IV  is the estimate of the causal effect using instrumental variables that overcome 
the endogeneity or selection based on unobservables by seeking to identify exogenous 
drivers of the country groupings Z . 
The endogeneity bias depends on the sign of Cov , the covariance between the 
unobserved part of the outcome and the unobserved component of the selection on the 
treatment. In our example, this is the correlation between what is anticipated by the policy 
makers but what goes unobserved in the econometrician component of antitrust 
effectiveness and the unobserved driver of adopting leniency. 
On the other hand, the literature on randomised experiments provides a dominant 
approach to the analysis of the causal effects of programs or policies in observational 
studies. Imbens and Wooldridge (2009) refer extensively to Rubin‟s proposals for 
interpreting comparisons of potential outcomes as causal statements: pairs for outcomes 
defined for the same country both when it is and when it is not treated. Moreover, Imbens 
and Wooldridge (2009) highlight that the main attraction of this potential outcome set-up is 
that it allows for general heterogeneity in the effects of the treatment from the outset. In 
practice, the heterogeneity of the effect is important, often motivating economists‟ 
concerns about endogeneity. 
In this case, selection on observables is a problem when E Z 0 . The unanticipated 
component of the antitrust effectiveness shock is correlated with the observable drivers of 
the self-selection on the treatment. The problem is still there when the anticipated part of 
the shock is zero, 0 . 
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In the literature, what has been referred to as unconfoundedness, exogeneity, ignorability, 
or selection on observables removes any self-selection bias in comparisons made between 
the treated and the control groups. Adjusting treatments and control groups for differences 
in covariates, or pretreatment variables, is the key to obtain causal inference of effects. 
Matching analysis was first proposed by Rubin (1974), in a paper in which he established 
the potential-outcome framework for causal inference. The seminal paper here is 
Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983). Let Y1 represent the outcome (here, antitrust effectiveness) 
in the case of a unit (a country) exposed to treatment (implementation of a leniency 
program), which implies that D, the binary variable describing treatment status, is equal to 
one. By analogy, Y0 is the outcome if the unit is not exposed to treatment (D=0). Our 
causal effect of interest is defined by the difference between Y1 and Y0, so it yields a 
problem of inference with missing data. 
The average treatment effect of interest to us is that on the treated group (hereafter ATT) 
and it can be defined as: 
E Y1 Y0 D 1  
We assume that both treatment status and potential outcomes are affected by a set of 
observable characteristics (Z). The potential outcome in case of no treatment is 
independent of treatment assignment, which states that: 
Y0 D Z  
 
Pr D 1 Z 1  
 
The first of these is the untestable conditional independence assumption (CIA); the second 
is a requirement for identification. Under these two conditions, the ATT can be identified 
as: 
ATT E Y1 Y0 D 1 E E Y1 Y0 D 1,Z
E E Y1 D 1,Z E Y0 D 0,Z D 1
 
 
Without selection on observables, or unconfoundedness, causal inference cannot be 
estimated by comparing the treated and the control groups using non-parametric 
techniques such as matching. Seen from this methodological perspective, the plausibility or 
otherwise of causal inference can only be verified by conducting a sensitivity analysis, i.e., 
evaluating the robustness of the inference to a set of „what-if‟ assumptions regarding the 
process of selection on observables. 
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Here we use four inference techniques to identify and quantify the causal effect of antitrust 
leniency programs on the efficiency of competition legislation across countries: (1) tests of 
equality of means and equality of distributions; (2) simple difference-in-difference 
techniques; (3) instrumental variable techniques for estimating dif-in-dif equations; and (4) 
matching estimators. 
First, we test the equalities of the means and of the distribution of the treatment group 
with respect to those of the control group. Second, we estimate difference-in-difference 
regressions to determine the mean causal effect, drawing on information before and after a 
comparison of the effect across countries. Third, using instrumental variables we check 
whether the estimates suffer from bias due to self-selection of adopters according to 
unobservables. Finally, we estimate non-parametrically using matching techniques to 
determine the lower bound of the causal effect, assuming that self-selection of the 
countries that adopt the program is conditioned only on observables. 
4. Results 
Table 4 and Figure 1 clearly show that the antitrust effectiveness outcomes of country-year 
pairs treated with the adoption of a leniency program and those of non-treated country-
year pairs differ, the average difference being around 0.6 (i.e., 11%). Figure 1 shows that 
this difference is most marked for country-year pairs with an antitrust effectiveness below 
the mean. However, this is insufficient to indicate the unequivocal effect of the treatment 
since country-year pairs might self-select into the treatment. 
Table 5 lists each country in our sample and its respective average antitrust effectiveness 
before and after treatment (including the dates on which the competition law was enacted 
and the leniency program adopted). The data suggest that countries at the top of the 
effectiveness ranking are more likely to adopt leniency programs, while countries some way 
off the top tend to have been early adopters. The data also show that adopters differ in 
terms of their observables, including the number of years since the enactment of their 
competition law, per capita GDP and NAFTA and EU membership. 
We first estimate the causal effect of leniency programs on antitrust effectiveness using a 
simple difference-in-difference estimator. Table 6 reports the OLS estimates of regressing 
antitrust effectiveness on a set of country fixed effects, year fixed effects and the leniency 
program binary treatment. The table shows the estimates for the full sample, for the sub-
sample of country-year pairs with competition law in force, and for the sub-sample of 
those with a competition law enacted before 1998. 
The estimates seem to suffer a strong attenuation bias. All estimates of the impact of 
leniency are very close to zero and are not statistically significant. This suggests strong self-
selection. However, we are unable to determine whether this self-selection is due to 
observables or unobservables, nor can we verify the direction of the bias.8 
                                                     
8 Estimates taking logs of antitrust effectiveness are very similar to those in levels (original IMD data). 
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To rectify this, we next estimate the difference-in-difference regression using instrumental 
variable techniques and generalised method of moments (GMM) procedures that are 
robust to the presence of binary endogenous treatment. 
Table 7 reports the instrumental variable (IV) estimates when regressing antitrust 
effectiveness on a set of country fixed effects, year fixed effects and the leniency program 
binary covariate. The key instruments for identifying the causal effect are observables, 
including GDP per capita and the integration of a country into a regional agreement. As 
the sample includes a large number of European countries, joining the EU during the 
sample period is considered a driver of the adoption of new antitrust rules in general, and 
of adopting leniency programs in particular. Additionally, we use the election covariate as 
an instrument on the grounds that countries seem much more likely to make legislative 
reforms in the “honeymoon” period following a general election. 
The IV estimates clearly show that endogeneity, or selection on unobservables, is present. 
They also indicate that the bias is strong and negative. Although the IV estimates are not 
particularly precise, they all show that leniency has a positive and very strong impact on the 
perception of antitrust effectiveness.9 As the bias is negative, the countries that adopt 
leniency programs are precisely the ones that have lower anticipated unobserved antitrust 
effectiveness ( it in the set up above) as the covariance between the unobserved drivers of 
program adoption ( it ) and the error term in the antitrust effectiveness dif-in-dif regression 
is negative: Cov = 0 . 
This would seem to be consistent with the pattern we described above. Thus, early 
adopters such as Italy and Belgium, who created programs in 1990 and 1999 respectively, 
rank relatively high in terms of their observables (e.g., GDP per capita), but they have an 
unobserved component that is lower than that of countries that occupy a similar ranking 
based on their observable covariates. 
An additional concern, therefore, is that the impact of the introduction of a leniency 
program may not be homogeneous across countries, and here too there might be a strong 
selection on observables. According to Heckman et al. (1997), a difference-in-difference 
analysis might include two sources of bias: the first arises when changes have occurred in 
some countries, but there are no comparable countries in which changes did not occur and 
vice versa. The second bias arises from different distributions of the vector of observable 
variables that affect our endogenous variable within the two groups of countries. 
The use of a matching estimator can eliminate these two potential biases by pairing treated 
countries (adopters of leniency programs) with control groups (the non-adopters) that 
present similar observable attributes.10 In our case, this ATT is obtained by using the kernel 
                                                     
9 Again, estimates taking log values offer very similar results. 
10 See Galiani et al. (2005) for an application of this method. 
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matching method.11 Matching relies on the assumption that the selection is on observables 
rather than on unobservables, as outlined above. But given that selection on unobservables 
biases the estimates downwards, we estimate matching to determine the lower bound of 
the estimates based solely on selection on observables. 
Table 8 summarizes the results of the matching estimator. In all the estimations we include 
the following as the exogenous variables driving the selection of the adopters on 
observables: “new country in EU”, “age of competition law”, “elections (t-1)”, “GDP (t-
1)” and “regional agreement”, as described in Table 1. The estimations were conducted 
using bootstrap techniques. 
Matching shows an average effect of adopting leniency from 0.23 to 0.31 points (maximum 
of 10) of antitrust efficiency. This represents a permanent increase of 4% to 5.4% over the 
sample average, and almost a third of one standard deviation. The effect is precisely 
estimated and is statistically significant at the 1% level. It is also around half of that 
obtained in the test of equality of means. Countries self-select on observables and this 
biases the mean comparison upwards. When correcting for self-selection on observables, 
the effect is halved.12 
As discussed above, the main weakness of using the matching estimator is that it relies on 
an assumption of conditional independence of potential outcomes and treatment 
assignment given observables (Nannicini, 2008). This implies that selection into treatment 
is driven solely by factors observable by the researcher.13 However, as we have seen, the IV 
estimations showed us that there may be some self-selection due to unobservables. 
Fortunately, in this instance the bias appears to be negative. Therefore, the causal effect we 
have estimated in the matching analysis is the lower bound of the true casual effect, which 
in this case we are not able to estimate precisely. 
In any case, to verify the robustness of these results to the selection solely on observables, 
we conducted a sensitivity analysis (Table 9) in line with Ichino et al. (2008) and as 
implemented by Nannicini (2008). This analysis assesses whether (and to what extent) the 
estimated average treatment effect is robust to possible deviations from the conditional 
independence assumption.14 
To perform this test, we simulate in the matching estimator a „killer‟ confounder (in the 
authors‟ terminology, U), which is used as an additional covariate. This confounder uses a 
set of parameters pij (where i refers to being treated or otherwise and j to a binary 
                                                     
11 Four of the most widely used matching methods are nearest neighbor, radius, stratification and kernel. 
None of them is a priori superior to the others. See Becker and Ichino (2002) for a further explanation. 
12 Again, very similar results in logs as shown in Table 8. 
13 See Heckman et al. (1997) for an explanation of the bias associated with matching analyses. 
14 Note that this is not a „test‟ of the conditional independence assumption, as this identifying assumption is 
intrinsically non-testable since the data are uninformative about the distribution of potential outcomes in the 
case of no treatment for treated units (Ichino et al., 2008). 
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outcome15), so that if U were observed, the estimated ATT would be driven to zero or far 
from the baseline estimate. Thus, we attributed some values to these four probabilities in 
accordance with the being treated (i) parameter and the outcome given (j) (p11, p10, p01, p00) 
and, if some of these configurations could be considered as being highly unlikely, then we 
had our support for the robustness of the matching estimations. 
Nannicini (2008) denominates d as a measure of the effect of U on the untreated outcome 
(d=p01-p00); and s as a measure of the effect of U on the selection into treatment (s= p1.-p0.). 
Both measures have to be greater than zero since this implies a positive effect on the 
untreated outcome and on the selection into treatment, respectively. They are associated 
with the values of G  and L, which are the estimated odds ratios of U reported as the 
“outcome effect” and “selection effect” of the simulated confounder, respectively.16 
We construct a table, in line with proposals in the two seminal papers (Nannicini, 2008 and 
Ichino et al., 2008), in which we simulate ATTs so that d and s increase by 0.1, varying 
from 0.1 to 0.6. What we are seeking are data that are quite similar to the baseline results 
when we increase both measures (d and s). The estimations in Table 9 show the robustness 
of our results because the ATT only tends to zero when s and d are greater than 0.4. 
5. Conclusions 
The dynamics of the creation of antitrust leniency programs across the globe provides a 
good description of policy innovation adoption. At the same time, the IMD survey data 
defining the perception of antitrust enforcement have enabled us to identify and quantify 
the impact of leniency program adoption on competition policy efficiency. 
The main problem we have had to overcome in this paper is that countries tend to self-
select into the treatment in a way that is unknown, although it would appear that program 
adoption does drive perceptions of antitrust effectiveness. We report here that countries 
self-select, being more likely to adopt the program according to observables that include 
per capita income and regional policy commitments. Nevertheless, at each level of 
observed likelihood of adoption, countries that exhibit lower unobserved antitrust 
effectiveness are also more likely to adopt the program as they benefit most from it. By 
correcting for one or other type of self-selection, we show that leniency programs have had 
a significant positive impact on the perception of a country‟s antitrust policy among the 
business community, especially in those countries whose antitrust enforcement is least 
credible. 
                                                     
15 For continuous outcome (the antitrust effectiveness index in our case), we adapt the methodology on the 
basis of a binary transformation: Y=1 if the effectiveness index is higher than average effectiveness and Y=0 
otherwise.  
16 The program sensatt in the STATA estimate, at every iteration, a logit model of Pr(Y=1|T=0, U, W) reports 
the outcome effect. For the selection effect, the logit model estimated is Pr(T=1|U, W). The other covariates 
are summarized at W. 
14 
Leniency programs have become weapons of mass dissuasion in the hands of antitrust 
enforcers against the more damaging forms of explicit collusion among rival firms in the 
market place. We find that this impact is equivalent to at least a 4% gain in antitrust 
effectiveness. 
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Tables and Figures 
 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
Variables Mean s.d. Min. Max. Source and observations 
Antitrust 
effectiveness 
5.62 1.23 2.40 8.59 IMD 
Leniency 0.37 0.49 0.00 1.00  
Competition Law 0.94 0.24 0.00 1.00  
Age of 
Competition Law 
22.12 26.22 0.00 118.00  
Per capita GDP 15,787.93 12,740.40 419.40 56,389.21 
Nominal prices. World 
Bank 
Elections 0.25 0.44 0.00 1.00 
1: General or presidential 
elections 
Countries passing 
their first 
competition law 
between 1998-2007 
0.16 0.37 0.00 1.00  
European Union 
(EU) 
0.37 0.48 0.00 1.00 
1: if the country is a EU 
member state 
New country in 
EU 
0.06 0.23 0.00 1.00 
1: new EU member state 
following  2004 enlargement 
NAFTA  0.06 0.24 0.00 1.00 
1: if the country is a 
NAFTA member 
Andean 
Community 
0.04 0.20 0.00 1.00 
1: if the country is an 
Andean Community member 
Asia-Pacific 0.06 0.24 0.00 1.00 
1: if the country is an 
ASEAN member 
Mercosur 0.04 0.20 0.00 1.00 
1: if the country is a 
Mercosur member 
Regional 
agreement 
0.58 0.49 0.00 1.00 
1: Country included in any 
of the above regional 
agreements 
Source: Authors‟ own calculations unless stated otherwise. 479 observations. Unbalanced IMD sample of 54 
countries over 10 years. Taiwan, for which GDP data are unavailable, is excluded. 
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Table 2. Description of regional variables 
Variables Description 
Countries for which the variable takes a value of 1 
for at least one year 
# countries 
European Union 
(EU) 
1=The country is an EU member 
that year 
Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Lithuania, 
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, 
Romania, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, 
United Kingdom 
24 
New country in EU 
1= New countries in EU since 
enlargement  
Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, 
Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovak Republic, 
Slovenia 
9 
Nafta 
1=The country is a Nafta 
member that year 
Canada, Mexico, USA 3 
Andean Community 
1=The country is an Andean 
Community member that year 
Colombia, Venezuela. 2 
Asia-Pacific 
1=The country is a member of 
the Asia-Pacific agreement that 
year 
Mainland China, India, Korea 3 
Mercosur 
1=The country is a Mercosur 
member that year 
Argentina, Brazil 2 
Note: There were 19 countries for which all these variables take a value of  0: Australia, Chile, Croatia, Hong Kong, 
Iceland, Indonesia, Israel, Japan, Jordan, Malaysia, New Zealand, Norway, Russia, Singapore, South Africa, Switzerland, 
Thailand, Turkey, Ukraine. 
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Table 3. Policy diffusion 
 
Countries with leniency 
program 
Countries in the IMD 
Survey 
% adopters 
1998 1 45 2% 
1999 7 46 15% 
2000 11 46 24% 
2001 15 48 31% 
2002 17 48 35% 
2003 20 50 40% 
2004 28 50 56% 
2005 31 50 62% 
2006 36 52 69% 
2007 37 54 69% 
Source: Authors‟ own calculations based on information obtained from competition authorities‟ websites and 
the International Competition Network (ICN). 
 
 
 
Table 4. Mean antitrust effectiveness index 
No leniency Leniency 
Absolute 
difference  t-test 
of mean equality 
Relative 
difference 
Two-sample Kolmogorov–
Smirnov tests of the equality 
of distributions 
Sample # Obs 
5.36 (1.30) 6.03 (0.99) 0.66 (0.10)*** 12.31% 0.25*** All 489 
5.38 (1.35) 6.03 (0.99) 0.64 (0.11)*** 11.89% 0.24*** 
Only 
countries with 
competition law 
459 
5.35 (1.32) 5.99 (1.01) 0.64 (0.12)*** 11.96% 0.24*** 
Only 
countries with 
competition law 
predating 1998 
383 
Source: Authors‟ own calculations. Note: *** 1%, ** 5%, *10% significance test. Standard errors within 
brackets. 
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Table 5. Descriptive statistics by country (1998-2007) 
Country 
Antitrust 
Effectiveness 
Before Leniency 
(average) 
Antitrust 
Effectiveness 
After Leniency 
(average) 
Absolute 
Change 
Relative 
Change 
Year of 
First 
Competition 
Law 
Year of 
Competition 
Law Reform 
Year of First 
Leniency 
Program 
Finland 7.78 7.59 -0.19 -2.4% 1988 2004 2004 
Denmark 7.35    1998 No change 2007 
Australia 7.27 7.42 0.16 2.2% 1974 No change 2003 
Germany 7.26 7.26 0.00 0.0% 1958 2005 2000; 2006 
Austria 7.10 7.77 0.67 9.4% 1988 2006 2006 
Netherlands 7.17 7.14 -0.03 -0.4% 1998 2004; 2007 2002 
New Zealand 6.92 6.93 0.01 0.1% 1986 No change 2000 
Canada 6.84 6.82 -0.02 -0.3% 1889 No change 2000 
Norway 6.87 6.59 -0.28 -4.0% 1993 2004 2004 
Singapore 6.40 6.78 0.38 6.0% 2004 2004 2004 
USA n.a. 6.51   1890 No change 1978, 1993 
Chile 6.42 6.53 0.11 1.7% 1959 1999 2005 
Iceland 6.49 6.29 -0.20 -3.2% 1993 2005 2005 
Ireland 6.57 6.37 -0.20 -3.0% 1991 2002; 2006 2001 
Luxembourg 6.44 6.41 -0.04 -0.5% 1970 2004 2004 
Sweden 6.49 6.36 -0.13 -2.0% 1993 No change 2002 
France 6.22 6.34 0.12 2.0% 1953 2001 2001 
South Africa 6.19 6.41 0.22 3.5% 1999 2001 2004 
Belgium 5.64 6.35 0.71 12.5% 1993 2006 1999 
United 
Kingdom 6.21 6.22 0.01 0.2% 1948 2002 1998 
Switzerland 6.21 6.05 -0.16 -2.6% 1995 No change 2004 
Israel 5.68 6.14 0.46 8.1% 1950 No change 1988 
Taiwan 6.01 5.59 -0.42 -7.0% 1992 2002 2006 
Estonia (*) 5.62       1993 2001; 2006 No Leniency 
Spain 5.63 5.22 -0.41 -7.3% 1989 2007 2007 
Japan 5.45 5.81 0.36 6.5% 1947 2005 2005 
Hungary 5.51 5.55 0.04 0.7% 1996 No change 2003; 2006 
Malaysia 5.47       No law No change No Leniency 
Hong Kong 5.37       No law No change No Leniency 
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Country 
Antitrust 
Effectiveness 
Before Leniency 
(average) 
Antitrust 
Effectiveness 
After Leniency 
(average) 
Before and 
After 
Absolute 
Change 
Before and 
After Relative 
Change 
Year of 
First 
Competition 
Law 
Year of 
Competition 
Law reform 
Year of First 
Leniency 
Program 
Portugal 5.27 5.64 0.38 7.1% 1993 2003 2006 
Jordan (*) 5.33       2004 2004 No Leniency 
Korea 4.29 5.41 1.12 26.2% 1980 1997 1997 
Brazil 4.97 5.13 0.16 3.3% 1988 2000 2000 
Greece 4.98 5.05 0.07 1.3% 1977 No change 2006 
Slovak 
Republic (*) n.a. 4.98     1994 2001 2001 
Czech 
Republic 4.17 5.32 1.15 27.6% 2001 2001 2001 
Colombia 4.89       1959 No change No Leniency 
Italy 4.65 4.83 0.18 4.0% 1990 No change 1990 
China 
Mainland 4.81       No law No change No Leniency 
Mexico 4.89 4.18 -0.72 -14.7% 1992 2006 2006 
India 4.87 4.60 -0.26 -5.4% 1969 2003 2003 
Lithuania (**) 4.73       1999 1999; 2004 No Leniency 
Turkey 4.73       1997 No change No Leniency 
Thailand 4.53       1999 1999 No Leniency 
Romania (*) 3.73 4.07     1997 2003 2004 
Venezuela 4.07       1992 1997 No Leniency 
Slovenia (*) 4.00       1993 1999; 2004 No Leniency 
Poland 3.55 3.92 0.37 10.4% 1990 2004 2004 
Bulgaria (*) n.a. 3.50     1991 2003 2003 
Indonesia 3.49       1999 1999 No Leniency 
Croatia (*) 3.46       1995 2003 No Leniency 
Argentina 3.37       1923 1999 No Leniency 
Ukraine (*) 3.23       1993 2001 No Leniency 
Russia 3.22       1991 2006 No Leniency 
Source: Authors‟ own (based on IMD World Competitiveness Yearbook). 
Note: Countries marked with (*) did not have these data available for the whole period. Countries marked 
with (**) only had data available for the last year. 
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Table 6. Dif-in-Dif Estimators. OLS. In levels, original data 
 Antitrust Effectiveness Antitrust Effectiveness Antitrust Effectiveness 
Leniency -0.05 (0.07) -0.002 (0.08) -0.003 (0.08) 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 479 449 383 
Sample All 
Only countries with 
competition law 
Only countries with 
competition law predating 
1998  
Note: *** 1%, ** 5%, *10% significance test. Robust standard errors within brackets. Taiwan excluded due to 
perfect multicollinearity). 
 
 
Table 7. Dif-in-Dif Estimators. In levels, original data 
 
Antitrust 
Effectiveness (IV) 
Antitrust Effectiveness 
(IV) 
Antitrust Effectiveness 
(IV) 
Leniency 2.54 (1.41)* 4.99 (5.14) 5.69 (6.24) 
Impact/Mean 45.04% 88.48% 100.89% 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 479 449 373 
Instruments 
New country in EU, 
Regional Agreements, GDP(-
1), Elections(-1) 
New country in EU, 
Regional Agreements. GDP(-
1), Elections(-1), Age 
competition law 
New country in EU, 
Regional Agreements. GDP(-
1) 
Instruments Validity 
(Overidentification J 
Hansen Test) 
0.72 (p = 0.86) 1.04 (p=0.90) 2.9e-15 (p = 1.00) 
F-test strong 
instruments 
15.55 (p = 0.00) 8.96  (p = 0.00) 10.49  (p = 0.00) 
Sample All 
Only countries with 
competition law 
Only countries with 
competition law predating 
1998  
Note: *** 1%, ** 5%, *10% significance test. Robust standard errors within brackets. 
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Table 8. Summary of results of the matching estimator (IMD original data) 
 
Antitrust 
Effectiveness 
Antitrust 
Effectiveness 
Antitrust 
Effectiveness 
in levels, original data 
Leniency 0.225* 0.230*** 0.306*** 
Impact/Mean 3.99% 4.07% 5.43% 
in logs 
Leniency 0.055*** 0.057*** 0.069*** 
Impact (%) 5.65% 5.87% 7.14% 
Sample All 
Only countries with 
competition law 
Only countries with 
competition law predating 
1998 
Note: *** 1%, ** 5%, *10% significance test. Standard errors within brackets. 
 
Table 9. Sensitivity analysis of the matching estimator (in levels, original data, only 
countries with competition law passed before 1998). Leniency. ‘Killer’confounders 
  s=0.1 s=0.2 s=0.3 s=0.4 s=0.5 s=0.6 
  Γ Λ Γ Λ Γ Λ Γ Λ Γ Λ Γ Λ 
d=0.1 
0.308 0.307 0.306 0.267 0.238 0.194 
1.573 1.542 1.605 2.349 1.704 3.534 1.683 5.913 1.781 9.511 1.880 19.423 
d=0.2 
0.300 0.277 0.256 0.198 0.149 0.095 
2.415 1.506 2.433 2.240 2.547 3.680 2.668 6.031 2.613 11.073 3.008 24.188 
d=0.3 
0.283 0.251 0.204 0.117 0.069 0.007 
4.001 1.539 3.958 2.429 3.952 3.952 4.058 7.024 4.463 12.593 4.545 34.112 
d=0.4 
0.273 0.231 0.168 0.071 -0.009 -0.092 
5.972 1.563 5.757 2.461 5.976 3.929 6.336 6.956 7.395 16.850 8.205 106.117 
d=0.5 
0.265 0.201 0.113 0.008 -0.073 -0.246 
10.026 1.541 10.035 2.647 10.806 4.366 10.567 9.090 10.946 27.205 21.951 54.487 
d=0.6 
0.247 0.179 0.067 -0.045 -0.174 -0.457 
19.347 1.555 18.507 2.503 20.542 4.461 20.683 8.483 22.331 43.304 150.312 70.909 
Note: Under the assumption that Pr(U=1)=0.4 and p11-p10=0, the differences d= p01-p00 (which capture the 
outcome effect of U in the absence of treatment) and s= p1· - p0· (which captures the effect of U on the 
selection into treatment) uniquely define the parameters pij, with i,j={0,1}. All ATTs are averaged over 100 
iterations. Γ is the average estimated odds ratio of U in the logit model of Pr(Y=1|T=0, U, W); Λ is the 
average estimated odds ratio of U in the logit model of Pr(T=1|U,W). The baseline estimate without 
confounder is equal to 0.306. 
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